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Abstract 
Despite varying levels of political pluralism, democracy is not at home in either of the 
secessionist entities of Transnistria and Abkhazia, where the development of a siege 
syndrome hampers democratic developments and conflict settlement. In Transnistria 
there is no credible opposition, no active civil society, foreign funding for NGO’s is 
prohibited and it is policed by a strong repressive apparatus guided by the ministry of 
state security. The economy is highly concentrated and even if big businesses are 
dissatisfied with the current political leadership they do not dare to challenge the 
authoritarian leader who has held power for a decade and a half. While Abkhazia is 
certainly no beacon of democracy it does enjoy a higher degree of pluralism than 
Transnistria. It has held elections and its civil society is active and well developed for 
the region. Elements of democracy exist but the ethnic Georgians who account for 
about a third of the population have been excluded from such developments. This 
paper inquires into the origin of these developments and addresses such questions as 
how undemocratic the secessionist entities really are, whether they are inherently 
undemocratic and why are some less democratic than others. It gives an account of 
domestic policies in Transnistria, and the political processes in Abkhazia and part of 
South Ossetia and concludes with an analysis of the factors that determine divergent 
political patterns in the secessionist entities. 
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Introduction1  
The study of democracy and democratic transition in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union is a well developed field. However, existing literature almost never deals 
with democratic developments, or lack of it, in a number of secessionist entities that 
emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the regions of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. 
These secessionist entities don’t exist on the map, as they are de jure part of 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. But they do exist in reality, and their impact on 
regional and European politics is real. Most politicians and observers take for granted 
the lack of democracy in these secessionist entities. But by their regional standards, 
some of the secessionist entities boast surprising levels of political pluralism. Certainly, 
all the secessionist entities are very far from functioning democratic entities. But the 
domestic politics in these secessionist entities should not be ignored, nor downplayed. 
They can tell an interesting story of how political pluralism fails or succeeds not only in 
a postcommunist transition, but also in a post-war context. 
Take the stories of Transnistria and Abkhazia that formally are part of Moldova and 
Georgia. Transnistria and Abkhazia are both secessionist entities that emerged after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union both are unrecognized internationally, isolated from 
international developments, and very closely associated and supported by Russia. 
However their democratic credentials could hardly be more different. In the 
Caucasus, Abkhazia is poor, destroyed after the war, still living in a constant 
psychological expectation of war (which is not always groundless), in a deep 
demographic crisis, quite rural, under economic blockade, isolated from the outside 
world geographically and politically, far from Europe, and in a region that is 
undemocratic and unstable. 
Transnistria tells a different story. It is a few dozens kilometers from the border of 
the enlarged EU, it is situated between the more or less democratic Ukraine and 
Moldova proper, it is industrialized, urban, relatively developed, almost half of its trade 
is with the EU and the US, war with Moldova does not seem to be even a theoretical 
                                            
1 Nicu Popescu is an OSI Research Fellow at the Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels and PhD 
candidate at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. This research was conducted as part 
of the International Policy Fellowship. 
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possibility, foreigners can travel easily there and it has the biggest population of the 
secessionist entities in former Soviet Union. 
The obvious candidate for greater pluralism, if not democracy, is Transnistria. But 
this is not so. Surprisingly, it is Abkhazia which has a relatively developed civil society, 
where the opposition won presidential elections at exactly the same time as the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and its media is an interesting reading. By contrast, the 
political elite in Transnistria and its de facto president remained in firm control through 
methods which were far from democratic. No change of presidents, no critical media, a 
suppressed and small civil society, and no credible opposition, except for a few virtual 
parties designed to create an illusion of political competition. 
Thus the present paper tries inquire the origin of these developments. It tries to 
address such questions as: how undemocratic the secessionist entities really are? Are 
secessionist entities inherently undemocratic, or there are other factors that determine 
undemocratic developments? And finally why some secessionist entities are less 
democratic than others? What explains patterns of more democratic developments in 
some secessionist regions, while not in others? 
The structure of the paper is as following. First, it gives an account of domestic 
politics patterns in Transnistria. Second, it looks into the political processes in 
Abkhazia, and partly South Ossetia. It concludes with an analysis of the factors that 
determine divergent political patterns in the secessionist entities. 
1 Domestic politics in Transnistria 
The secessionist authorities in Transnistria have managed to build a more or less 
functioning statelike entity. Transnistria has an organized political leadership, control 
over a defined territory and seeks international recognition. Its domestic politics is 
highly authoritarian. The way Transnistria survived as an unrecognized entity for some 
15 years rests on a number of economic, political and security factors. These factors 
are crucial when trying to understand domestic politics patterns in the region.2 
1.1 Economic factors 
                                            
2 This section is partly based on the author’s “The EU in Moldova – Settling Conflicts in the 
Neighborhood”, Occasional Paper 60, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2005. 
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Economically, Transnistria has survived by trade – legal at times, but mainly semi-
legal and illicit. Transnistria’s economic survival has been assured by Russian gas, 
which is never paid by Transnistria, and amounts to a significant underwriting of 
Transnistrian separatism. The region has exported steel and textiles mainly to EU 
member states and the United States. In fact, the competitiveness of Transnistria’s 
exports is based on lower tariffs for gas and electricity, possible because of Russia’s 
support.3 By the region’s standards, these factors have created a rather solid basis for 
the separatist leadership to claim that economically Transnistria is a functioning entity. 
Controlling a considerable part of Moldova’s border with Ukraine, as well as trade 
routes from Moldova to Russia and Ukraine, coupled with involvement in arms trade 
and all forms of trafficking – all of these factors have created a strong incentive 
structure to maintain the status quo.4 Control of the border has turned into a lucrative 
business where Transnistria has been a transit point for smuggled goods into Ukraine 
and Moldova.5 
The Transnistrian economy is highly concentrated. A dozen enterprises dominate 
the economy of the region, and small and medium enterprises produce a negligible 
share of the local GDP. The biggest economic asset of the region is the Rybnitsa steel 
works, or MMZ, which allegedly accounts for almost half of the Transnistrian GDP and 
over a half of the region’s budget income. The main Transnistrian companies, such as 
Moldavizolit, Moldavkabel, Tighina, Floare, Tirotex, Odema, MMZ, and Vestra all have 
established relations with Western partners. There are at least eighteen Transnistrian-
German joint ventures set up in Transnistria. The Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
of Tiraspol and Leipzig have direct ties.6 
Smuggling activities have been protected and controlled by a few clans, all of them 
connected and dependent on the secessionist authorities. Thus most economic activity 
in Transnistria is controlled by a few groups situated at the confluence between legal 
and illegal business and politics. 
1.2 Political environment 
                                            
3 See the Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms, Evolution of the Transnistrian Economy: critical 
appraisal (Chisinau: October 2001); available at: www.cisr-md.org. 
4 Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2004. 
5 Interviews with experts of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova, Kuchurgan and 
Kiev, May 2006. 
6 See Anatoly Gudym, Vladislav Kutyrkin, Galina Shelari, Transnistrian Economy: Initiatives and Risks, 
June 2003: available at: http://www.cisr-md.org 
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Politics in Transnistria has been determined by the imperative of its elites to retain 
power. These elites benefit politically and economically from the status quo. The 
leadership of Transnistria has suppressed any form of political non-loyalty, let alone 
opposition to the government. But they have also managed to build a strong political 
regime. 
The entity is dominated by an elite that that does not play according to the 
democratic rules of the game. Nor can it be considered representative of the population 
of Transnistria, as none of the elections in Transnistria over the last decade have met 
even minimal standards of fairness and freedom. Igor Smirnov, the president of 
Transnistria and a Russian citizen, is an authoritarian leader whose regime is based on 
the suppression of any dissent. A Ministry of State Security, or Ministerstvo 
Gosudrstvennoi Bezopasnosti, is highly influential and all-pervasive in the business, 
media, universities, and fake civil society organizations. 
At the same time Transnistrian authorities have managed to impose some kind of 
order after the war on secession. Unlike in many other post-conflict environments, the 
post-war situation did not degenerate into a chaos of total insecurity, competing militias 
and landlords controlling different chunks of the border. The secessionist authorities 
could assert their dominance of the political, security and economic life of the region, 
and have ensured what could be called a monopoly on the use of organized violence in 
the region. 
This was partly realized through the integration of irregulars (Kozaks and the so 
called Transnistrian guards or gvardeitsy) into an oversized security apparatus, and 
ruthless elimination of those potential landlords who challenged Smirnov immediately 
after the 1992 war. Thus, in some respect Transnistria’s authoritarianism rests on a 
strong political regime that is undemocratic but functional. 
In order to divert international criticism for lack of democracy, as well to divert 
internal dissatisfaction with the current leadership, the Transnistrian authorities initiated 
a process of fake party building. After almost 15 years of non-existence of political 
parties, in just a few weeks in July and August 2006 a number of virtual parties and 
political movements were suddenly registered.7 The aim was to fake a multi-party 
political system, while maintaining the authoritarian nature of the regime intact.8 Such 
                                            
7 Vladimir Socor, Russian Political Campaign for a second Kalinigrad, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 August 
2006. 
8 On how post soviet states build façade democracies see Andrew Wilson’s Virtual Politics: Faking 
Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, Yale University Press 2005. 
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virtual parties would allow Transnistrian to say that they have a multi-party system, 
while not compromising on the essence of the regime. 
1.3 Civil society 
Civil society is extremely weak and under pressure in the region. The few NGOs 
that are not dependent on the government try to focus on social, rather than political 
issues and are subject to governmental pressure. Openness and the circulation of 
ideas and people is discouraged. The attitude towards the NGOs was expressed by 
highly-influential head of the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security, Vladimir Antiufeev, 
who stated: ‘The West, or more exactly the US, considers it timely to liquidate the 
Transnistrian statehood. The many NGOs are to be used as an instrument of 
accomplishing a coup d’état […] Youth are brainwashed […] For example, students of 
the Transnistrian State University are invited to international conferences, they receive 
grants etc … We are following this and we know that 90% of the funds provided by the 
West for financing agents of influence are being mismanaged. This is good. Otherwise 
we would have had more troubles’.9 And Antiufeev’s conclusion is that “the subversive 
activities of foreign intelligence services through non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) is becoming more and more a dominant security threat” for Transnistria.10 
These words result in deeds. There have been instances of open pressure and 
harassment of NGO activist. Foreign funding for NGOs was banned outright in March 
2006, but in May 2006 the ban was modified to include only funding for NGOs pursuing 
political objectives. Foreign funding also includes local companies which are more than 
20% owned by foreigners, anonymous sources of funding and international 
organizations.11 
NGOs however try to circumvent this ban by presenting their activities as social or 
educational projects.12 This has worked so far, but NGOs could have problems anytime 
as it is up to the authorities to decide where lies the thin line between educational or 
social projects which are apolitical and those which “pursue political objectives”. And 
                                            
9 Vladimir Antiufeev, ‘The West decided to liquidate Transnistrian statehood’ (‘Zapad reshil likvidirovati 
pridnestovskuju gosuderstvennosti’), Vremya Novostei 24 May 2005, available at: http://www.vremya.ru 
10 Speech by Vladimir Antiufeev in front of the employees of the Ministry of State Security of 
Transnistria,17 May 2006, http://olvia.idknet.com/ol76-05-06.htm 
11 See Olvia Press, 8 March 2006, http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol101-03-06.htm and 17 May 2006 
http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol79-05-06.htm Interview with a civil society activist, August 2006, Tiraspol 
12 Interview with a civil society activist, August 2006, Tiraspol Discussion with NGO activist from 
Transnistria, Brussels, October 2005. 
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still, NGO activists emphasize that despite pressures, “it is possible to work in 
Transnistria”, and that more external support is needed. 
Besides pressure, the authorities 13 also created and support a wide network of 
“obshetvennye organizatsii”, which are different types of movements, organizations and 
associations which are not independent from the authorities, but create the illusion of a 
developed and active civic sector. 
However, the weak civil society in Transnistria reflects not only the hostile attitude of 
the secessionist authorities but also lack of international support for NGOs. Until one or 
two years ago support for civil society development in Transnistria was not even on the 
agenda of international donors. Unlike in Abkhazia (see below), the EU has not been 
involved in civil society support in Transnistria either. And even now, there is little 
support for NGOs in Transnistria, except for a few projects financed by mainly Great 
Britain and eventually the Czech Republic. 
Despite the ban on foreign funding, NGOs can receive foreign financial support for 
their social or educational projects. Moreover, many Transnistrian civil society groups 
created NGOs which are registered in both Transnistria and Moldova, and they have 
bank accounts in both Chisinau and Tiraspol. This allows them to apply for foreign 
funding while remaining less vulnerable to the Transnistrian authorities. 
 
 
1.4 Legitimizing de facto statehood 
Transnistria’s state building project is a comprehensive endeavor, the main aim of 
which is to build a ‘Transnistrian identity’. This is a difficult task. The conflict in 
Transnistria was not an ethnic one. Transnistria’s population consisting of ethnic 
Moldovans (38%), Ukrainians (28%) and Russian (26%), is the same as in Moldova, 
though with a slightly different share of ethnic groups. But in any case due to the nature 
of Transnistrian demography, Transnistria’s secessionism and its identity-building 
project cannot be based on ethnic or religious lines. This has only increased the 
                                            
13 Discussion with NGO activist from Transnistria, Brussels, October 2005. 
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importance of invoking, manipulating and inventing historic, political and economic 
arguments in favor of Transnistria’s independence. Because the ideological foundations 
of Transnistrian independence have been shaky, the authorities have always been 
interested in strictly controlling the formulation of political views inside Transnistria. 
Over time, a multilayered discourse justifying Transnistrian independence has 
emerged. Since there was no overwhelming ethnic, political, economic or historical 
argument for independence, Transnistria’s pro-independence discourse had more 
elements, than one finds in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kosovo or Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which had a strong unifying factor – ethnicity. The independentist discourse in 
Transnistria discourse seeks to strengthen support for independence in the region and 
also to convince its population that the economic and political sacrifices they suffer as a 
result of embarking on a secessionist path are well worth the difficulties. 
At the start, Transnistria’s separatist project had language issues at its core. The 
Transnistrian population was mobilized in 1989 as a result of greater assertion by the 
Moldovans in the Soviet Union of their own language rights, a project that was not 
shared, and was even opposed by the active, urban and russified parts of the  
population in Transnistria.14 The Soviet, and subsequently Russian, authorities also 
employed Transnistria as a leverage against Moldova’s independence in order to keep 
the ‘near abroad’ firmly under Russian control. With Moldova’s declaration of 
independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, the desire to stay within the 
Soviet Union or Russia, and fear of Moldova’s unification with Romania came to join the 
‘language problem’ at the forefront of Transnistria’s justifications for independence. 
However, with time, these justifications have lost relevance. Moldova did not unite 
with Romania. Minority rights in Moldova proper are reflecting international standards 
and practices. History, demography, fears of Romania or discrimination remain part of 
the official discourse of the Transnistrian authorities, but their credibility, both internally 
and externally has significantly reduced since the beginning of the 1990s. This was 
evident with the coming to power in Moldova of the Communist Party, which shared 
with the Transnistrian authorities very similar views on history, language issues, the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the attitude towards Romania etc. As a result, 
Transnistria’s legitimization discourse has shifted mainly to economic arguments. This 
decreasing validity of initial justifications also led to increasing authoritarianism, 
                                            
14 For a detailed account of mobilization for independence from Moldova see Ghenadii Kodreanu, 
‘Dnestrovskij Razlom: Pridnestrovskii krizis i rozhdenie PMR;’ available at: http://olvia.idknet.com. 
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centralization and mobilization in the separatist region, because economic arguments 
for independence are not enough and do not correspond to reality. It has become 
therefore all the more important that they are not challenged inside Transnistria. 
Still, economic arguments have been central in building ideological support for 
Transnistrian independence from Moldova. The economic argument has several 
dimensions. A first one is that Transnistria is richer than Moldova, and once it is 
independent it will be even better off. A typical propagandist slogan says that compared 
to Moldova Transnistria “is like the Riviera.”15 A second is that if Transnistria joins 
Moldova it will have to participate in the repayment of Moldovan debts to international 
institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. A third point is that Moldova wants 
Transnistria ‘back’ in order to privatize Transnistria’s industry and benefit from these 
profits16 and that Moldova wants Transnistrian companies to pay taxes in Chisinau, 
from which ordinary Transnistrians would not benefit. Transnistria’s self-proclaimed 
president argues these points bluntly: ‘Why do we need Moldova? […] We have a gross 
domestic product per capita which is three times higher than in Moldova […] That is 
why Moldova is so interested in our property, that is why they always shout about 
privatization’.17 Smirnov again: ‘We are entirely self-sufficient (…) Moldova does not 
have enough potential for a self-sufficient existence’.18 
In fact, Moldova GDP per capita in 2004 was US$760 per capita,19 while that of 
Transnistria was US$750 per capita.20 Both are equally poor, but Transnistria’s debt per 
capita is much higher than that of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova (without 
Transnistria) has 3.5 million people and a debt of €1.1 billion (US$1.3 billion), while 
Transnistria with a population of 550,000 people has a debt of €1 billion (US$1,2 
billion), two thirds of which are with Russia.21 Roughly speaking Transnistria’s per 
capita debts are 6 times higher than that of Moldova. Thus, despite all the claims of the 
authorities, Transnistria is slightly poorer, not richer than Moldova; and far more 
indebted. 
                                            
15 See http://visitpmr.com/travelreports.html  
16 Igor Smirnov states that ‘in pushing Transnistria towards a union with economically bankrupt 
Moldova,one should give us reliable guarantees that our enterprises will not be given away to repay 
[Moldova’s] debts.’ Interview with Kommersant Moldovy, 21 September 2001; available 
at:www.zatulin.ru/institute/sbornik/039/10.shtml. 
17 Interview with Igor Smirnov, ‘We have to assume responsibilities,’ Pridnestrovie, 21 April 2005. 
18 ibid. 
19 US Department of State, Background Note on Moldova, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5357.htm 
20 Igor Smirnov, Press conference dedicated to the ‘Independence day’ of Transnistria, 31 August 2005, 
http://olvia.idknet.com/ol97-08-05.htm 
NICU POPESCU: DEMOCRACY IN SECESSIONISM 
 12
Transnistria’s economic arguments for independence do not reflect reality, but are 
an instance of ‘imagined economy’,22 where the very belief that the entity lives better, or 
would live better than the state it wants to secede from, and not actual economic facts, 
mobilizes populations in favor of secessionism. Transnistria’s prosperity, economic 
growth and democracy exist only on propagandistic websites. They do not exist in 
reality, but only in the virtual space of controlled media and PR projects.23 
1.5 Challenging Authoritarianism? 
Transnistrian authoritarianism is increasingly challenged from within. Important 
internal actors in Transnistria have started to discuss the possibility of alternatives to 
the current situation. In April-May 2005, a significant group of deputies led by Evgheni 
Shevchuk, then deputy speaker of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, launched a series 
of initiatives to limit the powers of the Smirnov-led executive. These initiatives included 
a change in the constitution that would enhance the powers of the legislature, introduce 
the post of Prime Minister (Smirnov being currently both President and Prime Minister), 
and enhance the independence of the judiciary. In December 2005 the Shevchuk-led 
political movement Obnovlenie (Renewal), managed to obtain more seats in the 
elections to the local parliament than the more pro-Smirnov movement Respublika. 
However, Shevchuk’s alleged challenge failed, when it became clear that Smirnov was 
firmly in control of the levers of influence over politics and the economic groups behind 
Obnovlenie. Control of the intelligence services and support from Russia were the key 
factors which allowed Smirnov to reassert his power. 
However, the very emergence of such a challenge to Smirnov was interesting in 
itself. One explanation was that business groups have recognized that they have much 
to lose economically from the continuing deterioration of the regional situation and 
obstruction to the negotiation process as well as from Smirnov’s authoritarian excesses 
                                                                                                                                            
21 Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms, Research Paper on Transnistria, Chisinau, November 2003, 
p.28; available at: http://www.cisr-md.org 
22 See Yoshiko M. Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism, 
Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
23 See typical how the “virtual reality” of a democratic, European, pro-Western, rapidly growing 
economically Transnistria is being developed on such websites as 
www.visitpmr.com,www.pridnestrovie.net and www.tiraspoltimes.com . All these websites seem to be 
part of the same network of PR projects. On these PR projects see Vladimir Socor “Dezinformatsiya Alive 
but Transparent”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 July 2006; and “Covering Tracks” in The Economist, 3 
August2006 and Edward Lucas “Disinformation flows along the Dniestr river”, in European Voice, 31 
August 2006. 
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and human rights abuses (such as during the ‘schools crisis’ in 2004)24 – all of these 
actions have led to the greater international isolation of Transnistria, and ultimately 
resulted in greater economic pressure being placed on Transnistrian exports, including 
through the double-checking mechanism in steel, and most important a new border 
regime introduced by Ukraine in March 2006 whereby Transnistrian companies cannot 
export without registering with Chisinau authorities. Transnistrian authoritarianism has 
thus started to hurt real businesses. In these circumstances, these deputies have 
realized that greater checks and balances were needed to ensure that the authoritarian 
domination is reined in. 
And yet, the political challengers and the economic interests behind them continue 
to play within the narrow political corridor set by Smirnov, and are careful to stress their 
loyalty to Smirnov personally. Broadly speaking, despite some maneuvering, they still 
remain committed to the current authorities, even if this support is less solid than it used 
to be. 
2 Domestic politics in Abkhazia 
As the case of Transnistria showed conflict situations are not the kind of 
environments in which democracy, human rights and pluralism would prosper. In such 
political environments opposition is often weak and dissenters are readily labeled as 
supporters of the other side.25 This is largely true for Abkhazia. However, policy 
dynamics there are quite different from Transnistria’s. 
The most spectacular difference is that Abkhazia went through a change in 
leadership through contested elections in 2004/2005. This is not enough to build a 
democracy, but it is certainly different from the situation in Transnistria. 
In Abkhazia there are certain levels of pluralism in the political debates, and there is 
a nascent civil society, which is relatively active. Abkhaz even claim that by regional 
                                            
24 In July 2004 Transnistrian militia attempted to forcibly close down the only five Moldovan schools in the 
region that were using Latin script. This has affected some 4,200 children who were deprived of their 
right to study in their mother tongue. The Transnistrian security forces stormed an orphanage in Tighina 
and a school in Rybnitsa. The OSCE qualified this as ‘linguistic cleansing’. The crisis prompted a serious 
diplomatic crisis with security and economic implications. Moldova tried to apply economic pressure on 
Transnistria, a dangerous standoff between Moldovan police and Transnistrian militia took place in 
Tighina/Bender. The crisis ended with Transnistria accepting, under international pressure, the 
functioning of the schools for another year. For a detailed account of the crisis see Gottfried Hanne and 
Claus Neukirch, ‘Moldovan schools in Transnistria: an uphill battle against “linguistic cleansing’”, June 
2005, OSCE Magazine. 
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standards they are one of the most democratic entities in the South Caucasus.26 While 
this is an exaggeration, compared to growing authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, Russia 
and Armenia, the political processes in Abkhazia are not deteriorating at least. And this 
is an achievement. 
2.1 Presidential Elections in Abkhazia 
In 2004 Abkhazia held presidential elections, in parallel with elections in Ukraine 
which led to the Orange Revolution. The first tour of the elections in Abkhazia took 
place on 3 October 2004. Already in the electoral campaign the then-prime minister 
(and former head of local intelligence services and minister of defense) Raul Khajimba 
was supported by the then president of Abkhazia Vladislav Ardzinba and the 
government of the Russian Federation. Russian support was at the highest level. 
On 29 August President Putin met Raul Khajimba in Sochi.27 After this meeting Raul 
Khajimba was campaigning with posters depicting him and President Putin shaking 
hands.28 A few days before the elections, on Abkhazia’s “Victory Day” of 30 September, 
a big delegation from the Russian State Duma visited Abkhazia and campaigned in 
favor of Khajimba. Referring to the Putin-Khajimba meeting a Russian expert claimed 
that “in any Russian region such an unambiguous choice by Putin would have provided 
a 100% guarantee of the success of the operation “successor” and the coming into 
power of the person chosen by Kremlin.”29 
 However, Raul Khajimba lost elections to his rival Sergei Bagapsh. But Bagapsh’s 
victory was not acknowledged by the electoral commission and the authorities. 
Apparently, Bagapsh won after the balance of votes was tipped in his favor by the votes 
of the Georgian-inhabited Gali region of Abkhazia. For two months the two candidates 
were disputing each other’s victory, and the situation degenerated to something close 
to armed conflict between the supporters of the two contesters. During this standoff 
                                                                                                                                            
25 David Keen, “War and Peace: What’s the Difference”, in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram 
(eds.): Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century , Frank Cass, London, 2001, p. 7 
26 Interview with a de facto minister of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, March 2006. 
27 See “Khadjimba in the Bushes” (Khadjimba v kustah), Vremya Novostei, 31 August 2004, 
http://www.vremya.ru/2004/156/4/106399.html 
28 For the Russian role in the Abkhaz 2004 elections see “Putin Meddles in Abkhazia Presidential Race”, 
Civil Georgia, 31 August 2004, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7721 
29 Alexandr Krylov, “The Results of the Abkhaz Elections” (Itogi Vyborov v Abhazii), Carnegie Moscow 
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Russia firmly supported Khajimba despite the fact that Bagapsh was not less pro-
Russian than his rival.30 
A few days after the elections a Russian state employee (of Abkhaz origin) from the 
Ministry of Emergency Situations Nodar Hashba was appointed prime minister to try 
solve the situation by calling new elections (which was the main request of Raul 
Khajimba).31 When Bagapsh decided to proceed with his inauguration on 6 December 
2004, Russia applied open pressure on Abkhazia to make him accept Khajimba’s 
requests. Without any doubts, the Russian intervention was on behalf of Russian 
officials. First, Aleksandr Tkachev, the governor of the Russian Krasnadar region 
bordering Abkhazia, threatened to close the border and stop paying pensions to the 
residents of Abkhazia if Bagapsh does not accept Khajimba’s requests for a re-run of 
the elections.32 Then Gennady Bukaev, an aid to the Russian prime minister stated that 
Russia is ready to fully close the border with Abkhazia "in case of further 
unconstitutional actions by Sergey Bagapsh."33 On 1 December 2004 he announced 
that Russia stops the rail communications and blocks the import of agricultural goods to 
Russia, including mandarins which constitute the main export from Abkhazia during that 
time of the year.34 
Another Russian official, deputy-prosecutor general Vladimir Kolesnikov traveled to 
Abkhazia to mediate between the two contenders, where he stated inter alia that 
Bagapsh’s intention to proceed with the inauguration was lacking legitimacy.35 A 
Russian nationalist deputy, and deputy speaker of the State Duma Sergei Baburin 
summarized the then-Russian policy: “The artificial blockade of Abkhazia was 
undertaken to make Sergei Bagapsh leave”.36 
In the end Russia imposed a deal whereby Bagapsh was accepting to run together 
with Khajimba for a new (third) round of elections, and Khajimba would become vice-
                                            
30 For a paper on Russian policies towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria see the author’s 
Outsourcing de facto statehood: Russia and the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova, Centre for 
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31 See “Abhazia bez novogo prezidenta”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 October 2004, 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/10/08/abhaziya-premier.html 
32 “Tkachev Prigrozil Sosediam”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 25 November 2004, 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/11/25/tkachev-abhazia.html 
33 “Russia threatens to blockade Abkhazia”, Civil Georgia, 1 December 2004, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8461 
34 “Karantin na mandariny” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2 December 2004, 
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president having in subordination the power ministries. After Bagapsh was re-elected in 
tandem with Khajimba in January 2005, Bagapsh managed to sideline Khajimba from 
the main decisions and from control of the power ministries. Bagapsh also rebuilt his 
relations with Russia. 
2.2 Civil society 
Civil society in Abkhazia has enjoyed relatively strong support from the international 
community. There have been many international donors working in the conflict region. 
For example, between 1997 and 2006 the EU committed some 25 mln euro for projects 
in Abkhazia. From 2006 the EU became the biggest international donor to Abkhazia, 
and it was set to double its financial assistance to the region. EU funds were dedicated 
to rehabilitation of the conflict zones and support for civil society development.37 For a 
comparison, no EU funding was ever allocated for civil society support in Transnistria. 
In Abkhazia civil society still faces problems with the authorities, but civil society 
groups have much greater room for activity than in Transnistria. There is a high degree 
of mistrust of NGOs and their international donors in Abkhazia, and especially from the 
part of certain quarters in the de facto authorities,38 particularly the highly influential 
military and intelligence services. However, since 2005 there have been some positive 
trends in the attitude of the authorities towards the NGOs and the media in Abkhazia. In 
any case due to an active civil society and considerable international support, the 
authorities have been more and more tolerant of civil society activism. In addition 
Bagapsh has been appreciative and supportive of civil society activism in Abkhazia.39 
Despite difficult circumstances, civil society has been present in the life of the 
region. A civil society activist interviewed in Sukhumi claimed that there are some 10-15 
active NGOs in Abkhazia, and 5-6 of them being very active.40 Considering the size, 
state of the economy and international isolation of Abkhazia, this is a rather high 
number of active NGOs for a region of 250.000 people. Despite the fact that 
Transnistria’s population is more than double of Abkhazia, it has less active and 
                                                                                                                                            
36 “Baburin obvinil Rossiiskuiu storonu v iskusstvennoi blokade Abhazii”, Regnum.ru, 6 December 
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37 See Overview of European Commission Assistance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, update, July 
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genuinely independent NGOs, and anyway most of them try to work on politically 
neutral issues. 
Civil society in Abkhazia also publishes a periodic journal,41 has more or less regular 
civil society roundtables where political issues are discussed openly, and even 
monitored the 2004 elections by creating a broad NGO Coalition “For fair elections” in 
Abkhazia. This would be unthinkable in Transnistria. 
Certainly, a better developed civil society in Abkhazia and greater international 
support was partly due to the consequences of war which was incomparably more 
brutal and longer than in Transnistria. This meant that there was a  greater international 
humanitarian interest in helping the population of Abkhazia to overcome at least some 
of the post-war hardships.42 Moreover, NGOs, with international support but not only, 
were crucial in overcoming some of the consequences of war, and there was a much 
greater humanitarian and social need of these structures, as they dealt with such issues 
as humanitarian assistance, environment, helping displaced people, demining activities, 
lobbying on behalf of war veterans, education, overcoming psychological trauma 
(especially of children), human rights monitoring, conflict analysis, supporting the 
media, civil society development and democratization.43  
2.3 Abkhazia’s weak regime 
Somehow favorable to such pluralistic developments was the fact that the political 
regime in Abkhazia is weak. Lucan Way argued in relation to Moldova that the 
“immediate source of political competition is not a robust civil society, strong democratic 
institutions, or democratic leadership but incumbent incapacity […] Politics remain 
competitive because the government is too polarized and the state too weak to 
monopolize political control.”44 This also applies to cases of greater post-soviet 
pluralism such as Georgia, Ukraine, and partly Kirghizstan. Abkhazia appears to have 
the same structural weaknesses, which favor political pluralism. Thus, to some extent 
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Abkhazia, is also a case of “failed authoritarianism”45 where the authorities were too 
weak to impose authoritarian control, while the society was able to oppose such 
tendencies. The presidential elections in 2004 were a proof of that. 
However the weakness of the political regime has its prices. Abkhazia seems to 
much less of a functioning entity than Transnistria. There are little social services, little 
order, very high criminality, and for years after the war Abkhazia was still facing various 
groups of landlords involved in criminal activities and challenging the authorities’ claim 
to control the territory of the whole Abkhazia. The Abkhaz de facto state in fact does not 
reach to many areas it claims its own. The difficult geography of a mountainous region 
and traditions of independentist mountaineers makes it more difficult. 
2.4 Ethnocratic Pluralism 
The democratic picture in Abkhazia would look good by regional standards, but for 
one very significant factor. Crucial elements of democracy that exist in Abkhazia such 
as political pluralism, relatively active civil society, contested elections, pluralistic media, 
an emerging dialogue between civil society and the authorities, open opposition 
activities, are for only parts of the Abkhaz population. Elements of democracy in 
Abkhazia exist, but the ethnic Georgians, who account for roughly a third of the 
population, have been excluded from such developments. 
So far Abkhazia has been an ethnically exclusive secessionist projects. Their 
secessionist movements have been defined predominantly in ethnic terms of a struggle 
against the Georgians. Michael Mann argues that “modern ethnic cleansing is the dark 
side of democracy when ethnonationalist movements claim the state for their own 
ethnos, which they initially intend to constitute as a democracy, but then they seek to 
exclude and cleanse others.”46 Thus, the secessionist entity of Abkhazia became self-
governing only after expelling more than 200.000 of Georgians. 
In some respect what has developed in Abkhazia is a “collective ethnic ownership of 
land.” A central pillar of the secessionist project in Abkhazia is the idea of “our land”, 
which posits that only an ethnos is entitled to be the supreme owner of the land.47 The 
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notion of ‘the people’ has become entwined with an ethnos, rather than a demos as is 
commonly the case in Western democracies.48 Thus, in the local interpretation it is an 
ethnos that ‘owns’ the land, rather than all the inhabitants of the contested areas. 
Derluguian also traces the very start of the conflict to the fact that “After 1989 the 
prospect of competitive elections and market reform appeared as a direct threat to 
Abkhazes… Vastly outnumbered Abkhazes stood no chance against the Georgian in 
the coming competitive elections, and thus could expect to lose their power over state 
appointments in Abkhazia.”49 
In Abkhazia only one ethnos owns the land, and one ethnos is the source of 
sovereignty and political power. Virtually all governmental posts are held by ethnic 
Abkhaz. In fact the Abkhazes are a “dominant minority” in the secessionist region. For a 
comparison, before the 1992-1993 conflict ethnic Abkhaz were less than a fifth of the 
total population, and even now they are likely to be just over a third of the population, 
although reliable demographic data is unknown. In Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital, only 7 
percent of the population before the 1992-1993 war were ethnic Abkhaz.50 Certainly the 
basis of the current reality is that most Georgians have fled the region after the victory if 
the secessionists in 1993. In fact the current de facto statehood of Abkhazia rests very 
much on the precedent of expulsion of Georgians. The UN Security Council has 
condemned “the ethnic killings and continuing human rights violations committed in 
Abkhazia, Georgia.”51 Derluguian explained the terror strategy of ethnic cleansing 
employed by Abkhaz with the fact that it is the “weapon of the organizationally weak”, 
because ethnic cleansing aims at maximizing “the effect of a force of limited capability. 
A small irregular military that had no power to police the conquered Georgian civilians 
sought to drive out the potentially hostile population, and thereby in the long run to 
change the demographic balance through acts of conspicuous brutality.”52 
Today, even the ethnic Armenians and Russians leaving in Abkhazia, and who were 
loyal to the Abkhaz secessionist movement, are visibly under-represented in the de 
facto governmental structures. Despite the fact that there are surprisingly high levels of 
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pluralism in Abkhazia, one can talk an ethnocracy, i.e. democracy for one ethnic group, 
rather than of a proper democracy. 
On the positive side is that the problematic nature of an ethnocratic polity started to 
be acknowledged by a few in Abkhazia. Those who recognize that come from civil 
society background. Iraklii Khintba, an Abkhaz political scientist, acknowledges the 
problematic nature of “The de facto instauration in Abkhazia of an ethnocracy, where 
practically all positions in politics and the economy are controlled by Abkhazes.”53 
Beslan Kmuzov, an Abkhaz journalist stated that “there are more Armenians than 
Abkhazians there. By the way, even Georgians population prevails, however they are 
not allowed to take any offices. Abkhazians are the only part of the population that lives 
in freedom.”54 Acknowledging such contentious issues publicly is a difficult thing in 
Abkhazia. 
2.5 The Economy of Secessionism 
Abkhazia is under blockade from Georgia, and a formal economic blockade from the 
CIS, which is not enforced. Abkhazia survives mainly because of Russian tourists, 
Russia paying pensions to significant parts of the population, and individual 
entrepreneurial activities mainly in the tourist sector – from providing  accommodation 
in private houses and flats, to selling souvenirs. 
Another type of central economic activity for Abkhazia is the export of clementines, 
nuts and other fruits to Russia. But these exports are conducted mainly semi-legally by 
individuals on a very small-scale basis. These are not industries, but individual people 
to transport such products into Russia. Thus, Abkhazia’s economy is very fragmented. 
Individual entrepreneurial activity, not big scale businesses, is the basis of an atomized 
economy. People have to struggle and survive on their own. 
3 Democracy in secessionism 
It is not surprising that different secessionist entities have different levels of 
democracy. However, an analysis of (un)democratic developments in the secessionist 
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entities of the former soviet union, is not irrelevant. These secessionist entities share 
many common traits – in the way they emerged as secessionist entities, and in the way 
they survived after that. A comparison of democratic developments in Abkhazia and 
Transnistria allows to identify a number of factors that influence the way some 
secessionist entities develops, and to answer the question as to why some 
secessionists are more democratic than others? 
First, ethnicity plays a role. Abkhazes can afford more political pluralism because 
they are more ethnically homogenous. There is a basic consensus in Abkhazia of the 
imperative of secession. Since this basic bottom line is not challenged by almost 
anybody internally, Abkhazes can afford greater debates and pluralism, because these 
would not challenge the secession imperative. Power and opposition, civil society 
groups and independent minded media, alleged pro-Russians and pro-Westerners, 
would-be democrats and authoritarian conservatives are all equally in favor of 
independence from Georgia. This basic consensus made possible more debates and 
political pluralism on other issues, since debates would not question the foundations of 
the whole secessionist project. 
In Transnistria the situation is different. Its legitimacy is shaky. Open discussions, 
free media and a more democratic political process would probably challenge some of 
the basic myths around which Transnistria is created – that of economic prosperity 
relative to Moldova, that of an undemocratic Moldova willing to reunite with Romania 
and ready to prosecute Russian-speakers. Thus the Transnistrian regime feels less 
secure, and opted for a safety belt which is the region’s authoritarianism. However, in 
both secessionist entities Moldovans and Georgian and basically excluded from the 
political process and discriminated. And this phenomenon is more accentuated in 
Abkhazia than in Transnistria. To a certain extent Abkhazia can be more democratic 
because it is an ethnopolity. 
Second, Abkhazia’s main objective is independence, while Transnistria’s leadership 
main objective is to maintain power, as an independent entity or as part of a 
(con)federated Moldova. It is not uncommon in Abkhazia to hear that the more 
democratic Abkhazia will be, the greater its chances to gain international recognition. 
Thus, many in Abkhazia think that building a democratic entity will help to legitimize its 
                                                                                                                                            
54 Prime News, “There Is No Opposition Loyal To Georgia In Abkhazia, Abkhazian Journalist Says”, 17 
April 2006, Tbilisi. 
NICU POPESCU: DEMOCRACY IN SECESSIONISM 
 22
secession and quest for independence.55 Transnistria’s argumentation is diametrically 
opposed. President Smirnov openly states that he will retire “only after Transnistria will 
be recognized” internationally.56 Considering that this is a rather unrealistic prospect, it 
becomes obvious that staying in power is the primary goal of Transnistria’s leadership. 
Third, the structure of the economy influences democratic developments. A 
generally accepted argument is that the more prosperous a state is, the more likely it is 
to be democratic. This is not so straightforward. In the former Soviet Union Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan are more prosperous than Georgia, Kirghizstan or 
Moldova. But these poorer state are also more democratic. How to explain this 
paradox? The presence of natural resources is a factor, but more important is the 
structure of the economy. In countries with concentrated economies dominated by a 
few companies/clans/oligarchs, it is easier to consolidate authoritarian rule, than in 
countries with a GDP produced by small and medium enterprises, even if they are 
poorer. The paradox is that sometimes being poorer does not necessarily mean having 
less chances to be democratic. 
The same rule seems to apply to Transnistria and Abkhazia. Transnistria’s economy 
is concentrated around a few enterprises, while Abkhazia is so poor that its whole GDP 
is produced by small economic units and private entrepreneurs (mainly in the tourist 
sector), which are less dependent on the authorities. Transnistria’s concentration of the 
economy makes it both possible and feasible the control of the economy and the 
politics by an authoritarian leadership. It is possible to enforce authoritarian control 
because the security apparatus can easily control or coerce a dozen big businessmen 
which create almost the whole Transnistrian GDP. It also creates an incentive for such 
a control, because in an authoritarian regime it is easier to extract corrupt profits from a 
dozen big business groups. In a more fragmented (and poorer) economy it is more 
difficult to control the economic agents, because no security apparatus can centralize 
control of tens of thousands of people involved in small scale business activities. That is 
how the poorer Abkhazia scores better in terms of democracy than the relatively more 
prosperous Transnistria. Thus, in such a model not prosperity, but economic 
concentration defines how democracy evolves.57 
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Fourth, international support matters. In Abkhazia significant funds for almost ten 
years have been offered for civil society support by the international community. This 
was not unproblematic. NGOs have been accused of working for foreign forces hostile 
to Abkhazia. However, despite suspicions of civil society activities, and their sources of 
foreign funding, external support for Abkhazia’s civil society was crucial in its 
development as it allowed for the institutional development of NGOs. Inside Transnistria 
the internal political situation was less favorable to NGOs than in Abkhazia, but also 
foreign support has been practically non-existent. This is also one of the factors 
explaining the relative weakness of civil society in Transnistria compared to Abkhazia. 
Fifth, Abkhazia is less of a functioning entity than Transnistria. Transnistria’s de 
facto state authorities control the entire region, both geographically and functionally. 
These de facto authorities, and their unreformed intelligence services, do control the 
economy and politics of Transnistria. Abkhazia is different. The presence of the de facto 
authorities in the everyday life of the inhabitants of the region is not all-pervasive, and 
the secessionist authorities do not control the whole territory of Abkhazia. So in some 
respect Transnistria has a strong system of all-pervasive authoritarian power like 
Belarus, while Abkhazia’s weak and incapacitated institutions and polarized elites 
meant that civil society and pluralism had more political space to assert themselves, 
resulting in greater political pluralism. 
One of the results of Abkhazia’s greater pluralism is that its arguments for secession 
and international credibility are much greater than that of Transnistria.56 To a certain 
extent international support for civil society resulted in the emergence of a credible 
force advocating Abkhazia’s secession. However, one cannot but notice that Abkhaz 
civil society, albeit pro-independence, is also more open to some kind of reconciliation 
with Georgia and ethnic Georgians than other internal political or societal actors which 
have been less exposed to the international circuit of ideas. 
Despite divergent levels of pluralism, democracy is not at home in the secessionist 
entities. This is the case almost everywhere in the world, even though there are a few 
notable exceptions. Often secessionist entities are less democratic than the states they 
try to secede. Transnistria is less democratic than Moldova, Abkhazia is less 
democratic than Georgia, Northern Cyprus is less democratic than the Republic of 
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Cyprus in the South, and Tamil Eelam is less democratic than Sri-Lanka. Political rulers 
tend to overstay. 
President Denktash has been a leader of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since 
1974 and between 1964 -1974 leader of the Turkish community and vice-president of 
the still united Cyprus. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan are “ruthless, authoritarian 
and completely ideological”, they have no democratic accountability. 58 And the case of 
Transnistria has been already described. 
The “democracy deficit” in secessionist entities results from their reliance on 
sentiments of fear and insecurity. Many secessionist entities develop “under siege” 
mentalities because in the minds of peoples in these regions war is a distinct possibility. 
An Abkhaz deputy prime-minister puts it that “Everybody in the South Caucasus lives in 
the expectation of a real war. War is not something imaginary, but a real expectation for 
us.”59 Such feelings are sometimes well-grounded, but sometimes just an excuse for 
mobilization and authoritarian centralization. The state fear and insecurity impacts on 
the way societies develop in the secessionist entities. In such claustrophobic and 
closed environments, with small territories, little money, no jobs, constant fear of war, 
lack of possibilities to travel, high emigration, it is more difficult than ever to build 
democratic regimes. 
However, it is not secessionism itself that impedes democracy, but lack of basic 
security that encourages a “fortress under siege” syndrome and feelings of fear and 
insecurity that makes it difficult to develop democracies. The psychological state of war, 
sometimes more real and sometimes not, is often an excuse for extraordinary 
concentrations of powers. 
Conclusions 
A first glance at the political and economic realities in Transnistria and Abkhazia, 
would suggest that the former should have greater levels of democracy and pluralism 
than the later. However, this is not so. 
In Transnistria there is no credible opposition, no active civil society, foreign funding 
for NGOs is formally prohibited, and all this is policed by a strong repressive apparatus 
guided by the ministry of state security. Transnistria’s economy is highly concentrated 
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and even if big businesses are dissatisfied with the current political leadership they do 
not dare to challenge the authoritarian leader who was a de facto president of the 
region for a decade and a half. Transnistria’s ethnic composition is not very different 
from that of Moldova. Thus Transnistria could not mobilize the population in favor of 
secession from Moldova using ethnic fears and insecurities. 
Abkhazia is a different story. It is certainly not a “beacon of democracy”, but is 
enjoys greater levels of pluralism than in Transnistria. It had contested elections in 
2004/2005 which were won by the opposition. Its civil society is active and rather 
developed by regional standards. Political debates are rather open, and civil society 
enjoys strong international financial support. But Abkhazia’s achievements in this area 
are for only parts of the Abkhaz population. Elements of democracy in Abkhazia exist, 
but the ethnic Georgians, who account for roughly a third of the population, have been 
excluded from such developments. Thus Abkhazia’s pluralism is in fact a ethnocracy, 
i.e. democracy for one ethnic group. And still even Abkhazia’s “lame pluralism” is 
surprising compared to what one finds in Transnistria. What accounts for this 
difference? 
There are five factors that explain Abkhazia’s greater pluralism compared to that of 
Transnistria. Firstly, Abkhazia is a project of ethnic secessionism. Thus, Abkhazes can 
afford more pluralism because they are more ethnically homogenous, and nobody 
challenges the need for secession. In Transnistria the situation is different. It has no 
ethnic divide from Moldova, and the elites could not support ethnic mobilization against 
Moldova. Thus the Transnistrian regime feels less secure, and opted for a safety belt 
which is the region’s authoritarianism. Second, Abkhazia thinks that more democracy 
will increase its chances for international recognition. While Transnistria’s leadership 
main objective is to stay in power no matter what. Third, Transnistria’s industrialized, 
but concentrated economy made it feasible and profitable for the authorities to control 
through the security apparatus the economic agents. Abkhazia’s destroyed economy 
and reliance on individual entrepreneurial activities makes is less feasible to control 
tens of thousands of people who do not rely on the authorities for their survival. Fourth, 
Abkhazia’s civil society has benefited from significant international support, while 
support for Transnistria’s NGOs has been hardly existent. Fifth, Abkhazia is less of a 
functioning entity than Transnistria. Transnistria’s de facto state authorities control the 
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entire region, both geographically and functionally, while Abkhazia has a very weak 
political regime which could not impose authoritarian rule. 
Despite varying levels of political pluralism, democracy is not at home in both 
secessionist entities. Insecurity discourses are a permanent feature of Abkhazia and 
Transnistria which contributes to the development of a “fortress under siege” syndrome 
which hampers democratic developments and conflict settlement. Thus any efforts to 
support the resolution of these conflicts should include a more measures to support 
democracy and reconciliation. 
Recommendations 
To the European Union: 
• Facilitate access of Transnistrian NGOs to EU funds under European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument and the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 
• Start financing NGOs activities in Transnistria, 
• Expand funding for educational support in Abkhazia and Transnistria, inter alia 
through the funding of university courses about the history, politics and institutions 
of the EU, 
• Support the creation of European Information Centers or Europe Houses in both 
Abkhazia and Transnistria, 
• Provide more information about existing EU programs and funding opportunities in 
Abkhazia and especially in Transnistria, 
• Involve students from Abkhazia and Transnistria in EU academic exchange 
programs with its neighbors, 
• Commission a feasibility study on how to include the secessionist entities in the 
European Neighborhood Policy, 
• Fund more joint Georgian-Abkhaz projects to support reconciliation. 
 
To Georgia and Moldova: 
• Seek the inclusion of the secessionist entities into the European Neighborhood 
Policy, 
• Share as many of the benefits of ENP with the secessionist entities as possible, 
from guaranteed quotas in academic exchanges to the possibility to benefit from 
better trade regimes with the EU. 
 
To the secessionist entities: 
• Transnistria should revoke its ban on foreign funding of NGOs, 
• Abkhazia and Transnistria should seek ways to unilaterally start implementing 
some of the provisions of the European Neighborhood Policy, 
• Abkhazia should make it possible for foreigners to travel into Abkhazia without a 
clearance from the de facto foreign ministry. 
